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Abstract 
The key issue in the hedonic price theory is that although the literature emphasises the 
intrinsic nonlinearity in the relationship between house prices and housing characteristics, 
very little theoretical guidance is provided regarding the more appropriate mathematical 
specification for the hedonic price function. Thus, most empirical studies make use of 
flexible functional forms or simple linear models which possess a direct economic 
meaningfulness. This theoretical paper fills this gap by using the Mortensen-Pissarides 
matching model to show both the nonlinearity of the hedonic price function and the more 
appropriate functional relationship between prices and attributes. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the economic theory of hedonic prices (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974) is well 
known and not in question,
1
 it provides very little theoretical guidance on the appropriate 
functional relationship between prices and attributes in the hedonic price function 
(Malpezzi, 2003; Taylor, 2003), and thus in empirical studies researchers have used 
flexible functional forms, such as Box-Cox functions, or simple parametric models (Anglin 
and Gençay, 1996).
2
 
The hedonic price literature almost unanimously underlines the intrinsic 
nonlinearity in the relationship between house prices and housing characteristics, though 
nothing is known a priori about a specific functional form (Parmeter, Henderson and 
Kumbhakar, 2007; Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig, 2010). Nevertheless, while the 
literature suggests that the equilibrium price function is nonlinear, most empirical studies 
make use of linear models, thus relying on an influential simulation study by Cropper, 
Deck and McConnell (1988).
3
 This is due to the absence of theoretical groundwork 
regarding the more appropriate functional form to use in the hedonic price models. 
According to Rosen (1974), there is no reason for the hedonic price function to be linear; 
in fact, the linearity of the hedonic price function is unlikely as long as the marginal cost of 
attributes increases for sellers and it is not possible to untie packages. Indeed, Ekeland et 
al. (2004) demonstrate that nonlinearity is a generic property of the hedonic price 
function. Hence, a linear model would be a special case for the hedonic price function 
(Kuminoff, Parmeter and Pope, 2008, 2009). However, the nonlinearity is basically a 
general concept and may imply the use of several kinds of empirical models. 
As a rule, the use of a particular empirical model rather than another should be 
indicated by economic theory (Stock and Watson, 2003). Indeed, theoretical models are 
critical in determining an accurate and consistent econometric model: empirical analysis 
                                                 
1
 For an exhaustive overview see Sheppard (1999) and Malpezzi (2003). 
2
 Often linear, semi-logarithmic or log-log models are chosen. These are characterised as being easily 
interpretable, and the estimated parameters possess a direct economic meaningfulness (Maurer, Pitzer, and 
Sebastian, 2004). In particular, in the linear model, the parameters give absolute prices for the unit of the 
attributes. 
3
 Cropper, Deck and McConnell (1988) found that when all attributes are observed, linear and quadratic Box-
Cox forms produce the most accurate estimates of marginal attribute prices; whereas, when some attributes 
are unobserved or are replaced by proxies, linear and linear Box-Cox functions perform best. 
 2 
alone cannot replace conceptual reasoning when estimating the relationships of most 
economic phenomena (Can, 1992; Brown and Ethridge, 1995). 
This theoretical paper fills this gap by using the Mortensen-Pissarides matching 
model (see e.g. the textbook by Pissarides, 2000) to show both the nonlinearity of the 
hedonic price function and the more appropriate functional relationship between house 
prices and housing characteristics. In particular, under the realistic assumption of 
decentralised housing markets with important search and matching frictions (Leung and 
Zhang, 2011), in this model the equilibrium price function is nonlinear with a closed-form 
solution. 
Furthermore, the proposed housing market matching model allows a major 
drawback of the standard hedonic pricing theory to be overcome: the assumption of 
competitive markets. Indeed, in the standard hedonic pricing theory, markets are 
assumed to be sufficiently thick (i.e. markets with a large amount of trading) so that 
implicit or hedonic prices, i.e. the shadow prices of the characteristics, are revealed to 
economic agents through trades that differ only in terms of a single attribute. However, 
this is hardly true: markets become increasingly thin when traded goods are increasingly 
heterogeneous, and the implicit or hedonic prices as well as the "true" market value of the 
good are not known (Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans, 2003; Harding, Knight and Sirmans, 
2003; Cotteleer and Gardebroek, 2006). Indeed, the house price realistically depends not 
only on the housing characteristics but also on the search and matching frictions and 
bargaining power of the parties. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the housing 
market matching model; section 3 gives insights on the more appropriate functional form 
to use in the hedonic price models, while section 4 shows the empirical plausibility of the 
theoretical result; finally, section 5 concludes the work. 
 
2. A baseline matching model of housing market 
We adopt a standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. Pissarides, 
2000) with random search and prices determined by Nash bargaining. We believe that the 
behaviour of the housing market can be properly formalised by the Mortensen-Pissarides 
 3 
matching model. Indeed, the random matching assumption is absolutely compatible with 
a market where the formal distinction between the demand and supply side is very subtle; 
whereas, bargaining is a natural outcome of thin, local and decentralised markets for 
heterogeneous goods. 
Since we are interested in selling price, the market of reference is the 
homeownership market rather than the rental market. In this market, if a contract is 
legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the circumstances 
preceding the bill of sale, unless a new and distinct contractual relationship is set up. In 
matching model jargon this means that the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller 
match does not exist and the value of an occupied home for a seller is simply given by the 
selling price. 
Buyers (b) expend costly search effort to find a house, while sellers (s) hold 2h ≥  
houses of which 1h −  are on the market, i.e. vacancies ( v ) are simply given by 
( ) 0s1hv >⋅−= .4 It is therefore possible that a buyer can become a seller, and that a 
seller can become a buyer. Indeed, buyers today are in fact potential sellers tomorrow 
(Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). 
The expected values of a vacant house (V ) and of buying a house ( H ) are given by: 
5
 
( ) [ ]VPθqarV −⋅+−=                                   [1] 
( ) [ ]PHxθgerH −−⋅+−=                                   [2] 
where v/bθ ≡  is the housing market tightness from the sellers’ standpoint, while ( )θq  
and ( )θg  are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of filling a vacant house and of 
buying a home. The standard hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the matching 
function, { }bv,mm = , is adopted (see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), 
since it is also used in the (recent) search models of housing market (Diaz and Jerez, 2009; 
Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and 
                                                 
4
 Matters thus become simpler without loss of generality. Alternatively, one could assume that the sellers 
hold h ≥ 1 houses of which h are on the market, and that the buyers are the homeless. This case would not 
change the results of the analysis. 
5
 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the future at the exogenous 
interest rate r > 0. As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the stationary state. 
 4 
Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012).
6
 Hence, the properties of these functions are 
straightforward: ( ) 0θq' <  and ( ) 0θg' > .7 The terms a  and e  represent, respectively, 
the costs sustained by sellers for the advertisement of vacancies and the effort (in 
monetary terms) made by buyers to find and visit the largest possible number of houses. If 
a contract is stipulated, the risk neutral buyer gets a linear benefit x  from the property 
(abandoning the home searching value) and pays the sale price P  to the seller (who 
abandons the value of finding another buyer). The buyer’s benefit depends on the value of 
the house: in fact, the greater the quality/quantity of housing characteristics (i.e. the value 
of the house), the higher the buyer’s benefit. 
The endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously at equilibrium are 
market tightness ( θ ) and sale price ( P ). The “zero-profit” or “free-entry” condition 
normally used by matching models (see Pissarides, 2000) yields the first key relationship 
of the model, in which market tensions are a positive function of price. By using the 
equilibrium condition 0V =  in [1], we obtain: 
( ) a
P
θq
1
=                         [3] 
This positive relationship is very intuitive (recall that ( ) 0θq' < ): in fact, if the price 
increases, more vacancies will be on the market. 
Instead, the selling price is obtained by solving the following optimisation condition, 
the so-called Nash bargaining solution usually used for decentralised markets: 
( ) ( ){ }γ1γ PHxVPargmax P −−−⋅−=  
with ⇒= 0V ( ) ( )PHxγ1
γ
P −−⋅
−
=  
( )HxγP −⋅=⇒  
                                                 
6
 The main difference between our model and the quoted studies is that we closely track the standard 
matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides, without any deviation from the baseline model. 
7
 Standard technical assumptions are postulated: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ θglimθqlim θ0θ , and 
( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim θ0θ == ∞→→ . By definition, markets with frictions require positive and finite tightness, i.e. 
∞<< θ0 , since for 0θ =  the vacancies are always filled, whereas for ∞=θ  the home-seekers immediately 
find a vacant house. 
 5 
where 1γ0 ≤<  is the bargaining power of sellers. By using the previous result 
( ) ( ) P
γ
γ1
PHx ⋅
−
=−−  in equation [2], eventually we get: 
( )
( ) ( )γ1θgr
erxγ
P
−⋅+
+⋅
=
                                   
[4] 
Hence, if 1γ = , then x
r
e
xP >+= ; while it is unrealistic to assume 0γ = , since the price 
cannot be negative or null: in fact, entering into a contractual agreement obviously 
implies that Bx > , θ∀ . As regards the economic meaning of equation [4], if the market 
tightness increases, the effect of the well-known congestion externalities on the demand 
side (see Pissarides, 2000) will lower the price (recall that ( ) 0θg' > ). 
This simple model is able to reproduce the observed joint behaviour of prices and 
time-on-the-market (see e.g. Leung, Leong, and Chan, 2002). In fact, with a probability of 
filling a vacant house of ( )θq , the (expected) time-on-the-market is ( ) 1θq − . Hence, from 
equation [3], the house with a higher selling price has a longer time on the market; 
whereas, from equation [4], the longer the time-on-the-market the lower the sale price 
(since ( ) 1θq −  is increasing in θ ). 
It is straightforward to obtain from [3] that when P  tends to zero (infinity), θ  tends 
to zero (infinity), as ( )θq  tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the negative slope 
of [4] and the fact that price is always positive, only one long-term equilibrium deriving 
from the intersection of the two curves exists in the model. Finally, normalising the 
population in the housing market to the unit, sb1 += , and using the definition of 
vacancies, ( ) s1hv ⋅−= , and the value of equilibrium tightness ( v/bθ*θ =≡ ), the model 
is closed in a very simple manner. 
 
3. Hedonic price and functional form specification 
The two key equations of the model are the free-entry condition, i.e. equation [3], and the 
Nash bargaining solution, i.e. equation [4]. Indeed, the latter is none other than the 
hedonic price function of the model. As suggested by the hedonic price theory (Rosen, 
 6 
1974), the selling price is a (positive) function of housing characteristics. From [4], in fact, 
P  depends positively on x , which in turn depends positively on the housing 
characteristics (the value of the house). Hence, the hedonic or implicit price is positive and 
the equilibrium hedonic price function has a closed-form solution. 
However, unlike the standard hedonic price theory, the sale price of this model 
depends not only on the housing characteristics but also on the market tensions, 
bargaining power of the parties and search costs. In particular, market tensions are an 
endogenous variable of the model. Hence, in order to express the hedonic price function 
only in terms of exogenous variables we need to combine the equations [3]-[4]. By using a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form (also used by Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 
2009; Peterson, 2012), i.e. αα1 bvm ⋅= − , where α is the elasticity of the matching function 
with respect to the share of buyers, we get the following implicit function for selling price: 
( ) γeγrxPγ-1
a
P
r
α
α1
+=⋅








⋅





+
−
                                 [5] 
being ( ) ααα1 θ
v
bv
θq
−
−
=
⋅
= , ( ) ααα1 θ
b
bv
θg
−
−
=
⋅
=
1 , and 
α
1
a
P
θ 





=  from [3]. Total 
differentiation of equation [5] with respect to P  and x  thus yields: 
( ) ( ) dxγrdP
a
γ-1
a
P
α
α-1
Pγ-1
a
P
dPr
1
α
α1
α
α1
⋅=⋅








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

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

⋅





⋅+⋅


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

+⋅
−
−−
 
( ) ( )








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

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

⋅


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

⋅+⋅





+
=≡⇒
−
−−
a
γ-1
a
P
α
α-1
Pγ-1
a
P
r
γr
p
dx
dP
1
α
α1
α
α1
                                              
[6] 
For the sake of simplicity, we use a reasonable and common value of α = 0.5.
8
 Hence, the 
hedonic or implicit price of this model collapses to: 
( ) ( )





⋅+⋅





+
=≡
a
γ-1
Pγ-1
a
P
r
γr
p
dx
dP
 
                                                 
8
 See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Indeed, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) use a very similar value for the 
U.S. housing market, namely 0.57. It is straightforward to show that the result holds for any value of α. 
 7 
As a result, the hedonic price function is non-linear even if the buyer is risk neutral 
and acquires a linear benefit from the property: in fact, the implicit or hedonic price p
 
depends on x , since ( )Pfp =
 
and ( )xfP = . This is in line with the hedonic price literature 
which suggests that the equilibrium price function should be nonlinear. Furthermore, we 
may also state that ( ) 0xp'
dx
Pd
2
2
<≡ , since the selling price is increasing in the house value 
(namely, the hedonic price is positive). Hence, this theoretical model also gives a precise 
statement about the form of the hedonic price function: it in fact suggests an increasing 
relationship at decreasing rates between selling price and housing characteristics.
 
 
4. Empirical testing 
In order to test the empirical plausibility of an increasing relationship at decreasing rates 
between selling price and housing characteristics, we rely on the (structure of the) 
benchmark parametric model proposed by Anglin and Gençay (1996) – and also 
considered by Parmeter, Henderson and Kumbhakar (2007), and Haupt, Schnurbus and 
Tschernig (2010).
9
 
The Anglin-Gençay benchmark parametric model is characterised by many binary 
variables and the relationship between the dependent variable (selling price), the 
continuous regressor (the lot size) and the discrete variables is represented in terms of 
relative changes (elasticity). Data on housing characteristics, in fact, typically consists of 
one continuous regressor (the lot size) and many ordered and unordered categorical 
variables (Parmeter, Henderson and Kumbhakar, 2007; Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig, 
2010). Indeed, it is possible to transform all the ordered categorical variables into 
unordered categorical variables (binary regressors), thus saving degrees of freedom. 
Furthermore, the use of many binary regressors may be very useful to determine the most 
appropriate functional form, since dummy variables, by definition, cannot be transformed. 
                                                 
9
 Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig (2010) show that the null hypothesis of correct specification of the linear 
parametric model proposed by Anglin and Gençay (1996), against the alternative of parametric 
misspecification, cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level. Furthermore, they also show that 
the parametric model predicts better than the nonparametric specification proposed by Parmeter, 
Henderson and Kumbhakar (2007). 
 8 
Given our data availability, the econometric model is thus the following:
10
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ii9i8i7i6
i5i4i3i2i10i
εNWCβELVβQVWβARSβ         
LOCβSTATβWINSlnβBTMSlnβLOTlnββPln
+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
                 [7] 
where 
iP  is the selling price of house i ; STAT, LOC, ARS, QVW, ELV, and NWC are dummy 
(binary) variables for excellent state of real estate unit (1 = yes; 0 = no), valuable area (1 = 
yes; 0 = no), elegant architectural style (1 = yes; 0 = no), excellent quality of view (1 = yes; 
0 = no), presence of elevator (1 = yes; 0 = no), and new construction (1 = yes; 0 = no); 
BTMS and WINS are the number of bathrooms and windows, respectively; and LOT is the 
lot size (in square feet). 
Neglecting the binary variables,
11
 we focus on jβ , with 1,2,3j = . It follows that 
with 1β0 j <<  the relationship is increasing at decreasing rates, while with 1β j >  the 
relationship is increasing at increasing rates, finally with 1β j =  the relationship is linear. 
Using data on several Italian local property markets, the OLS results show that the 
coefficients jβ  have positive signs and are often statistically significant, i.e. 0βj ≠  (in 
particular, 
1β  always has a strong statistical significance). As regards the coefficients 2β  
and 3β , they range between 0.072 and 0.277 and the null hypothesis of 1β j =  is rejected 
at any reasonable significance level (thus confirming the nonlinearity of the hedonic price 
function); whereas, the value of coefficient 1β  ranges between 0.761 and 1.025 and thus 
in some cases the null hypothesis of 1β j =  can not be rejected. Nevertheless, it is very 
likely that the coefficient of lot size “absorbs” the effect of other quantitative variables 
which depend on the house size (number of bedrooms, garage places, stories, etc.), thus 
being overestimated. Indeed, in a regression without “number of windows” and “number 
of bathrooms”, the coefficient of lot size is always higher and ranges between 0.835 and 
1.173. Hence, an increasing relationship at decreasing rates may be the most appropriate 
functional form for the hedonic price function (as suggested by the theoretical model). 
                                                 
10
 It has not been possible to closely track the Anglin-Gençay model because of the different database used. 
11
 The coefficients for the binary variables give the surcharge which is to be paid relative to a property 
without those attributes. For more details about the economic interpretation of the effect of dummy 
variables on the dependent variable in natural logarithmic form see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980). 
 9 
Finally, this theoretical framework may be used to study how errors in measuring 
marginal attribute prices vary with the form of the hedonic price function; in this way, the 
simulation strategy developed by Cropper, Deck and McConnell (1988), and updated by 
Kuminoff, Parmeter and Pope (2008, 2009), may take the (equilibria of the) housing 
market with search and matching frictions into account, thus relaxing the unrealistic 
assumption of competitive housing markets.
12
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The hedonic price literature emphasises the intrinsic nonlinearity in the relationship 
between house prices and housing characteristics, though nothing is known a priori about 
a specific functional form. Indeed, the economic theory of hedonic prices provides very 
little theoretical guidance on the appropriate functional relationship between prices and 
attributes in the hedonic price function. This is a very significant shortcoming for empirical 
studies, since theoretical models are critical in determining accurate and consistent 
econometric models and the use of a particular empirical model rather than another 
should be indicated by economic theory. As a consequence, most empirical studies make 
use of flexible functional forms or simple models which possess a direct economic 
meaningfulness. This theoretical paper fills this gap by using the Mortensen-Pissarides 
matching model for insights regarding the nonlinearity of the hedonic price function. In 
particular, by relaxing the unrealistic assumption of competitive housing markets, the 
relationship between selling price and housing characteristics is increasing at decreasing 
rates. 
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